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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

LESLIE SMITH TRUBETZKOY,
Petitioner/Appellant,
Case No. 20080406
v.
SERGEI TRUBETZKOY,
Respondent/Appellee.

NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS AND JURISDICTION
This is an appeal of the rulings made by LA Dever in the case of the above named
parties. Lower Court case number 20080406.
This court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78-2a-3.

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
Issue I:
Did the trial court properly award joint legal custody after fully considering the
evidence and taking into account the best interests of the child?
Issue II:
Did the trial court properly award parent-time according to statutory standards in
order to preserve the best interests of the child when the parties could not otherwise
agree?
Issue III:
Did the trial court properly and equitably divide the parties' property?
Issue IV:
4

Did the trial court properly grant the divorce of the parties' based on
irreconcilable differences?
STANDARD OF REVIEW
This divorce proceeding is a civil case and, "[a] trial court's conclusions of law in
civil cases are reviewed for correctness and therefore no deference is given to the trial
court's ruling on questions of law. See, State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932 (Utah 1994).
Furthermore, when looking at child custody "[t]he trial court is given particularly broad
discretion in the area of child custody incident to separation or divorce proceedings. A
determination of the "best interests of the child" frequently turns on numerous factors
which the trial court is best suited to assess, given its proximity to the parties and the
circumstances. Only where trial court action is so flagrantly unjust as to constitute an
abuse of discretion should the appellate forum interpose its own judgment. Wall v. Wall
700 P.2d 1124, 1125 (Utah 1985).
Any additional factors regarding property are equitable decisions. "Under
prevailing standards of review, this Court may review both the facts and the law of
matters in equity . . . Nonetheless, we accord considerable deference to the judgment of
the trial court and interpose our own judgment only where the evidence clearly
preponderates to the contrary or the trial court abuses its discretion or misapplies
principles of law." Mineer v. Mineer, 706 P.2d 1060, 1062 (Utah, 1985).

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
1. The parties were married in July of 1993, and one child was born during the
marriage named Julia Trubetzkoy, born on December 30, 2000. R261.
2. The parties separated in February 2003, and Appellant filed for divorce in
5

September of 2005. R253.
3. Appellee began to do palm readings and sell items at Renaissance Fairs
approximately 30 years ago, or he had been involved in Renaissance Faires for
approximately 12 years previous to Appellant's involvement in the fairs. R5353,411:11 ln.23.
4. Appellee has assembled by hand all of the carts and display stands used in
his business. R410:31 ln.12,410: 1181n.24.
5. Appellee travels internationally, usually in Southeast Asia, to obtain the
inventory that he sells during the Renaissance Fairs. Rl 15, 262.
6. Appellee has participated in the same Renaissance Fairs for substantial periods
of time. He has participated in the Northern and Southern California fairs for
over thirty years, the Arizona fair for the last ten years, and fairs in Colorado
and Texas for the last seven years. R410: 113.
7. The parties purchased a property in Salt Lake City, Utah that includes a store
and a residential property in August 1996. R254, 263.
8. The parties purchased the store because Appellant did not like the fair life and
to give them additional income during the Christmas season. R410:122 ln.3,
R410:35 1n.l6.
9. Appellant has always been primarily responsible for the store, its management,
and the inventory kept there. R.410:122.
10. The parties' also own a piece of property in Colorado. R. 282.
11. Appellee lives in California in a trailer he uses at the two major fairs he sells
6

at in California. R.410:113.
12. Appellee applies to each fair on a yearly basis, and receives a yearly
employment contract. He does not have any influence over the boards that
make the decisions on entrance to the fairs. R263.
13.The parties' child, Julia, has been diagnosed with diabetes and mood disorder.
R.410:11,R410:84.
14. Julia has always primarily resided with the Appellant and Appellee stipulated
to primary physical custody with Appellant. R280.
15. Appellee requested joint legal custody in order to stay up to date with her
medical care and other aspects of her life. R.267.
16. Appellee requested standard parent-time because he loves his child and wants
to be apart of her life. R267, R410:124.
17. Appellee has always stated he is capable and willing to take care of all of
Julia's medical and emotional needs. R281, R410:126.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The trial court properly evaluated the evidence in this case according to the best
interests of the child. There was no physical custody determination to be made, only
legal custody. Appellant presented no evidence to show that Appellee should not be
allowed to share the right, privileges, and duties of being Julia's father. Therefore the
trial court properly granted joint legal custody.
The trial court also properly applied the statutory parent time for parents living in
different states. This schedule is presumptively in the best interest of the child, and the
child court adjusted it to meet Appellant's concerns over the child's birthday. The trial
7

court has broad discretion is custody and parent-time issues, and the courts finding should
not be overturned.
The property in this case was equitably divided as marital assets. Appellant did
not marshal the evidence, and therefore the courts factually findings cannot be overturned
by this court. Notwithstanding, no accounting of the business was necessary because
Appellee started the business before he met Appellant and as such was allowed to
continue the employment he has been doing for more than thirty years. The trial court
gave each party the property they already had possession of and equalized the difference.
No evidence was admitted as fact that contradicts an equitable division of property.
The divorce was properly granted on irreconcilable difference, and all finding of
the trial court should be upheld.
ARGUMENT

I.

THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY AWARDED JOINT LEGAL
CUSTODY AFTER FULLY CONSIDERING THE EVIDENCE AND
TAKING INTO ACCOUNT THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE
CHILD.
The only custody issue in this case was legal custody because Mr.

Trubetskoy ("Sergei") stipulated to Appellant having sole physical custody
knowing it was in the best interest of Julia, because of his traveling work
schedule. The trial court awarded joint legal custody to the parties because Judge
Dever found it was in the best interest of the child. Joint legal custody is defined
in Utah Code Ann. §30-3-10.1 as "the sharing of the rights, privileges, duties, and
powers of a parent by both parents." Utah law further states: "The court shall, in
every case, consider joint custody but may award any form of custody which is
determined to be in the best interest of the child." Utah Code Ann. §30-3-10.
8

This is exactly what the trial court did in this case. Judge Dever started with joint
legal custody and considering all the evidence weighed the best interests of the
child. The trial judge specifically found:
1. "The petitioner's claim that joint legal custody should be denied
because of the fear that the father may not have the experience to handle
the daughter's medical needs is without merit." R. 281.
2. "If there is a dispute as to medical treatment or education issues, the
petitioner has the deciding vote." R.281
Both of these statements clearly show that the trial judge took into account both
parties' arguments while maintaining the central purpose of providing for the best
interests of the child. Evidence showed that Sergei has experience with a family
member with diabetes, took a class about diabetes, and had made contact with
Julia's physiologist to discuss her diagnosis. R410:125-126, R410:86 lnl4. In
contrast, no evidence was presented that Sergei was incapable of making
informed decisions about Julia's care, or even that he has not taken interest in
such things. Furthermore, while awarding joint legal custody the trial judge still
gave the Appellant the final say on any matters of dispute regarding medical or
education decisions. This ruling in itself should alleviate any concerns Appellant
may have about joint legal custody. There should be no argument, because if
there is a dispute between the parties' she gets to make the final decisions.
Therefore, Appellant's statement that "the trial court did not make any findings as
to the best interest of the child . . . " lacks merit and support by the evidence, and
the trial court's ruling should not be overturned. Appellants Brief at 23.
a. The trial judge did not misapply the joint custody statute.
9

The Appellant claims that because the trial court stated in its order that
"the presumption in the law is for joint legal custody . . ." the judge misapplied
Utah statute. Appellant's brief at 23. However, as stated above the statute on
joint legal custody states: "Thecourt shall, in every case, consider joint custody .
.." Utah Code Ann. §30-3-10. Judge Dever was merely following this
requirement of the code and general custom in Utah. Appellant relies on the
Thronson case which was decided before the Statute was amended and does not
address this language. Thronson v. Thronson, 801 P.2d 428 (Ut. Ct. App. 1991).
Joint legal custody is normally presumed in Utah divorce cases, unless an
objection is made.
Furthermore, even if this court found that Judge Dever improperly stated
there is a presumption for joint custody the mistake is harmless error. The judge
also found that no evidence was presented to support denying Appellee joint legal
custody. R281. While on the other side significant evidence was presented
showing Sergei's interest in the health and welfare of his daughter. R410:125126, R410:86 lnl4. "Harmless error is an error that is sufficiently inconsequential
that there is no reasonable likelihood that it affected the outcome of the
proceedings." D.A. v. State fin the Interest of W.A.), 2002 UT 127, P36 (Utah
2002) quoting, State v. Evans, 2001 UT 22, |20, 20 P.3d 888. The Appellant
presented nothing but unsubstantiated claims that Sergei should not be given joint
legal custody, as a result the trial court's decision should be upheld.
b. Appellant cannot raise the issue of a parenting plan because it was
not argued in the trial court
Appellant raises the issue of lack of a parenting plan from either party as a
10

violation of Utah code. Appellant's Brief at 23. However, this issue was never
raised in the trial court and therefore cannot be addressed on appeal. "Issues not
raised before the district court are normally waived and cannot be raised for the
first time on appeal." Gardner v. Bd. of County Comm'rs, 2008 UT 6, P31-P32
(Utah 2008). This is because, "[B]y not allowing the trial judge an adequate
opportunity to consider the issues, [the plaintiff] waived the right to raise the issue
on appeal." Tschaggeny v. Milbank Ins. Co., 2007 UT 37, P 22, 163 P.3d 615.
The trial court award of joint custody should be upheld because the decision came
after the court reviewed all of the evidence and found it is in the best interests of
the child.

II.

THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY AWARDED PARENT TIME
ACCORDING STATUTORY STANDARDS IN ORDER TO
PRESERVE THE BEST INTEREST OF THE CHILD WHEN THE
PARTIES COULD NOT OTHERWISE AGREE.
The trial court found that the standard statutory schedule for parents living

in different states should apply in this case because the parties were unable to
agree. See Utah Code Ann. §30-3-35, §30-3-35.5. "The advisory guidelines as
provided in Section 30-3-33 and the parent-time schedule as provided in Sections
30-3-35 and 30-3-35.5 shall be presumed to be in the best interests of the child."
Utah Code Ann. §30-3-34. This presumption for parent-time remains unless the
Appellant could show by a preponderance of the evidence that less parent-time
should be awarded by any of the following factors:
(a) parent-time would endanger the child's physical health or significantly
impair the child's emotional development;
(b) the distance between the residency of the child and the noncustodial
parent;
(c) a substantiated or unfounded allegation of child abuse has been made;
11

(d) the lack of demonstrated parenting skills without safeguards to ensure
the child's well-being during parent-time;
(e) the financial inability of the noncustodial parent to provide adequate
food and shelter for the child during periods of parent-time;
(f) the preference of the child if the court determines the child to be of
sufficient maturity;
(g) the incarceration of the noncustodial parent in a county jail, secure
youth corrections facility, or an adult corrections facility;
(h) shared interests between the child and the noncustodial parent;
(i) the involvement or lack of involvement of the noncustodial parent in
the school, community, religious, or other related activities of the child;
(j) the availability of the noncustodial parent to care for the child when the
custodial parent is unavailable to do so because of work or other
circumstances;
(k) a substantial and chronic pattern of missing, canceling, or denying
regularly scheduled parent-time;
(1) the minimal duration of and lack of significant bonding in the parents'
relationship prior to the conception of the child;
(m) the parent-time schedule of siblings;
(n) the lack of reasonable alternatives to the needs of a nursing child; and
(o) any other criteria the court determines relevant to the best interests of
the child.
Id. Appellant did not show through a preponderance of the evidence that any of
these factors were present in this case and should alter the standard parent-time
schedule. Rather, Appellant stated at trial that she was not opposed to Appellee
having parent-time and that "she [Julia] enjoys the visits very much." R410:24
ln.22, R410:25 ln.4-5. Julia's Physiologist stated when asked about extended
visits "I think that's something Julia would probably really like." R410:87 ln.23.
Finally, Sergei has always held that he wants time with his daughter. In fact,
Appellant testified that in the first six months of 2008 Sergei called Julia nine
times, twice leaving a message, and he saw her twice in Salt Lake. R410:24
In. 17. In addition, Sergei testified that usually when he calls Appellant does not
answer, therefore any problem Appellant has with Sergei's effort to contact his
daughter is not due to lack of effort on his part. R410:125 ln7.
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Appellant makes several arguments about Judge Dever ignoring
Appellant's evidence at trial regarding parent-time, and not addressing the best
interests of the child. Appellant's Brief at 26. However, the Appellant is
confusing disagreement with Appellant's evidence with the court taking no
consideration of the evidence. The standard statutory parent-time was a
presumption that Appellant had to overcome; the trial judge after viewing all the
evidence did alter the standard schedule. The trial judge found, as Appellant
requested, that the parties should share Julia's birthday even though it falls within
the Christmas break which would be Sergei's time under the standard schedule.
R359. "[T]he trial court is required to make factual findings on all material
issues, [however] we also recognize that ff[t]he trial court is not required to recite
each indicia of reasoning that leads to its conclusions, nor is it required to marshal
the evidence in support of them." Waldrop v. Waldrop, 2008 UT App 140 (Utah
Ct. App. 2008), quoting Howell v. Howell 806 P.2d 1209, 1213 (Utah Ct. App.
1991), quoting Knickerbocker v. Cannon (In re Estate of Knickerbocker), 912
P.2d 969, 979 (Utah 1996).
Appellant also argues that Judge Dever improperly changed the parenttime schedule previously ordered at the Objection Hearing because Sergei
requested new provisions. Appellant's Brief at 27. This claim is factual
inaccurate. The reason for the change with the trial judge's exasperation with
Appellant's continued resistance to parent-time even after the court had made a
final order. The following conversation from the Objection hearing is illustrative:
THE COURT: So, what are you—what is his parent time if he comes to
Utah?
MS. SUTLIFF: It is whatever Paragraph 3 says his parent time is, he can
13

exercise it in Utah or California, as long as he gives the appropriate notice
and—
THE COURT: Well, that's very interesting. So he come to town for—for
three days and according to the statutory time that you have, he's not
entitled to see this child because it doesn't fit in one of those categories. Is
that it ? . . .
MS. SUTLIFF: Your order didn't talk about parent time otherwise, so this
is another reason why we were confused and wanted some clarification.
THE COURT: How—how—how confusing can that be to your client,
that if he comes to town, he's entitled to see his daughter?
R410:24-25. This record shows the trial judge was trying to "considered the best
interests of the children, which include Mhav[ing] frequent, meaningful, and
continuing access to each parent." Waldrop, 2008 UT App 140, quoting Utah
Code Ann. §30-3-32(2)(b)(i). Because Sergei lives in California the times he
comes to Utah are not as frequent as he would like because of expenses. Judge
Dever thought it important for Appellee to be able to see his daughter when he is
in the state. Appellant did not provide any evidence to support a reduced parenttime schedule, and the trial courts ruling on parent-time should be upheld.
III.

THE TRIAL COURT EQUITABBLY DIVIDED THE PARTIES'
PROPERTY.
The evidence is clear that the trial court made an equitable division of the

property in this case. The "trial court has considerable discretion concerning
property [division] in a divorce proceeding, thus its actions enjoy a presumption
of validity." Schaumberg v. Schaumberg, 875 P.2d 598, 602 (Utah Ct. App.
1994).
a. Appellant did not properly marshal the evidence and therefore the
property division of the trial court cannot be overturned.
In order to overturn the factual findings of the trial court regarding the
property division between the parties the Appellant must first marshal the
14

evidence. "In order to challenge a court's factual findings, an appellant must first
marshal all the evidence in support of the finding and then demonstrate that the
evidence is legally insufficient to support the finding even when viewing it in a
light most favorable to the court below." Chen v. Stewart, 2005 UT 68, P53
(Utah 2005)(quotation omitted). The marshaling requirement is more than just
making an argument.
The process of marshaling is . .. fundamentally different from that of
presenting the evidence at trial. The challenging party must temporarily
remove its own prejudices and fully embrace the adversary's position; [the
challenging party] must play the devil's advocate. In so doing, appellants
must present the evidence in a light most favorable to the trial court and
not attempt to construe the evidence in a light favorable to their case.
Child v. Child, 2008 UT App 338, f2 (Utah Ct. App. 2008)(citations omitted).
Appellant's brief simply sets forth her own argument and presents only the
evidence that supports her claim, she did not meet this strict marshaling
requirement.
b. The trial court divided the business assets equitably.
Contrary to Appellant's assertions the trial court equitably divided the
business assets as marital property. Appellant argues that the parties business was
a partnership and thus Sergei was required to make an accounting. However, the
trail court specifically rejected this argument because the parties did not create the
business together. "THE COURT: Well, they participated in the business
together; they obviously didn't start it together, because he was in the business
when he met her, so they didn't create it together." R411:11 ln.23. As such the
15

business assets were treated as marital property, not a partnership, and divided
equitably.
The order of the trial court is very specific that the "inventory is the
primary value of the business," and that the business doesn't have "any value
beyond the inventory and carts owned." R282-283. "We disturb a trial court's
property division and valuation only when there is a misunderstanding or
misapplication of the law resulting in substantial and prejudicial error, the
evidence clearly preponderates against the findings, or such a serious inequity has
resulted as to manifest a clear abuse of discretion." Elman v. Elman, 2002 UT
App 83, P17 (Utah Ct. App. 2002). The trial court's division followed the parties'
historical practice of Sergei selling at the renaissance fairs and the Appellant
operating the store in Salt Lake City. R264. Thus, Sergei was awarded the
inventory in his control and the carts to use at the fairs, and Appellant was
awarded the inventory at the store. R282. The court even equalized the
discrepancy in inventory awarded by giving Appellant all the equity in the parties
home in Salt Lake City. R282-283. No error was made by the court, and the
factual findings of the court regarding division of the business assets should be
upheld.
c. All other assets were divided equitably according to the evidence.
The trial courts property division was based in equity and should not be
overturned. Appellant claims that her calculations and values are
"uncontroverted." Appellant's Brief at 39. This is a complete distortion of the
record. Appellee's attorney objected to the admission of these calculations
(exhibit 9) at the trial, "Well I still am going to object. I think it's extremely
16

unclear what it is she's attempting to how or how she's come up with these
figures." R410:62 ln.3. As a result, the calculations were only admitted as
illustrative of Appellant's testimony, not as facts. R410:133-134. The trial court
gave each party the property in their own possession and divided the Colorado
property 50/50. There is no basis in the record that this is an inequitable division
of the parties' property.
IV.

THE TRIAL COURT PROPERTY GRANTED THE DIVORCE
BASED ON IRRECONCILABLE DIFFERENCES.
The Appellant's argument that this court should reverse the trial courts

factual finding that the divorce should be granted on irreconcilable differences has
no factual basis or legal purpose. The Appellant submitted no evidence that
suggest Sergei had an affair and thus a finding of divorce on grounds of adultery
was not supported by the evidence, and would only serve to humiliate the
Appellee. The trial judge said is clearly at the Objection Hearing:
I'm not going to take judicial notice that a person is committing adultery
when he says they're not—they're not doing it. Did you bring anyone
here to testify he saw them engaged in any sort of conjugal relationship?
No, you didn't. So, I'm not going to put it in there. So, that request is
denied.
R.411:5 ln9. Appellant's final argument is more than frivolous its intention is to
harm the Appellee. The trial courts granting of the divorce on irreconcilable
difference should be upheld.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, the Appellant respectfully asks this court to Uphold all finding of
the trial court and award appellate attorney's fees to Appellee for an unwarranted Appeal.
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